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OLIVER VOLCKART 
 
Bimetallism and its Discontents: Cooperation and Coordination Failure in 
the Empire’s Monetary Politics, 1549–59 
 
ABSTRACT: The article uses new sources to review the hypotheses that Charles V’s currency bill of 1551 
failed because of the electoral-Saxon resistance against the undervaluation of the taler that it stipulated, or 
because the emperor was too weak to overcome the estates’ resistance to collective action in monetary poli-
cies. The study shows that these issues were overshadowed by the dispute about whether a bimetallic curren-
cy should be established. Charles V’s currency bill failed because the Diet of Augsburg (1550–51) asked the 
emperor to publish it before all open issues had been resolved. This request placed the emperor in a dilemma 
where he had to make a decision but could not do so without antagonising important parties. It was the result 
of a coordination failure at the level of the Empire, which in turn was a consequence of a lack of continuity 
among those personnel involved in shaping monetary policies. 
Keywords: Monetary Politics, Currency Unions, Coinage, Bimetallism, Early modern history 
JEL-Codes: E50, H10, H60, N10, N40 
 
1. Introduction 
In June 1557 31 deputies, who represented 140 of the more than 300 estates of the Holy Ro-
man Empire, met in Speyer to discuss monetary policies. The topic was the currency bill 
Charles V had published six years before, the issue at hand the fact that most estates had so 
far failed to fully implement this law.1 The Imperial Diet had met in the city of Regensburg 
during the winter 1556 to 1557 to discuss the problem. There, the estates had suggested mak-
ing use of an audit of the Imperial Chamber Court in Speyer planned for the coming summer 
to convene a currency conference at the same place. Any estate holding grievances or com-
plaints against Charles V’s bill should make their views known; the deputies would discuss 
                                                          
1 The currency bill, dated 28 July 1551, was printed by Philipp Ulhart in Augsburg. A reprint appeared in a late 
sixteenth-century collection of Imperial law: Heinrich Brehm: Extract AVß allen Reichs- vnnd Deputations 
Abschieden vom Jahr 1356 vnd also von zeiten der guelden Bulla hero, was wegen gemeines Muentzwesens, 
Jtem von weiland Keyser Carolo V. Anno 51 so wol von Keyser Ferdinando Anno 59 außgegangenen 
ernewerten Edicten vnd Muentzordnungen, Valuation aller guelden vnd silbern Sorten vnd damals auffgerichter 
Probationordnung ... verordnet worden. Mainz 1597, fol. 8r–21v. A more recent print appeared in Johann 
Christoph Hirsch: Des Teutschen Reichs Münz-Archiv, Bd. 1. Nürnberg 1756, no. CCXII, pp. 344–365. For a 
modern critical edition see Oliver Volckart (ed.): Eine Währung für das Reich: Die Akten der Münztage zu 
Speyer 1549 und 1557. Stuttgart 2017, no. 90, pp. 344–372. For the recess of the coinage conference of 
June/July 1557 see: ibid., no. 107, pp. 429–431. 
them and would submit the results of their deliberations to the next Imperial Diet who would 
make a final decision.2  
At the currency conference, King Ferdinand – Charles V’s brother and designated successor – 
was represented by two commissioners. The report they sent to their principal emphasised the 
constructive atmosphere in Speyer. They praised ‘with what even-mindedness even those es-
tates’ had joined the talks, ‘who at the recent Imperial Diet had sharply and with bitterness 
cried out about the bill and law and had emphasised the serious complaints they held against 
it’.3 Even so, more than enough bitterness was in evidence. The deputies of the electors of 
Saxony, Cologne and the Palatinate flatly denied that their masters had ever agreed to Charles 
V’s currency bill, and the chancellor of the elector of Mainz stated that the publication of the 
law had never been authorised; it remained to be seen who had sent it to the printer ‘but the 
chancellery of Mainz was inculpable in this’. According to the report the delegates of the 
Saxon elector sent home, this was the cue for almost all other deputies: they had not realised 
that the bill had not been passed unanimously; if they had known, their masters would not 
have agreed to it, nor would they have started to issue coins in accordance with its regulations 
‘and all confessed and stated that it would have been much better if this currency law and or-
dinance had never existed’.4  
What had happened? This was no squabble about details of economic policies that had little 
practical relevance; rather, what was at issue was one of the central fields of politics pursued 
at the level of the Empire. There was no other economic problem that occupied emperors and 
Empire as permanently as that of how to create a common currency. Since the 14th century, 
emperors had tried to make their influence felt in this field,5 and since Sigismund of Luxem-
bourg’s time the issue was regularly discussed at Imperial assemblies.6 At his election in 
1519, Charles V had promised to remedy the deficiencies from which the money used in the 
Empire’s suffered,7 and the Imperial Governing Council (Reichsregiment) had in 1524 pub-
                                                          
2 Josef Leeb (ed.): Reichsversammlungen 1556–1662: Der Reichstag zu Regensburg 1556/57, vol. 2. Munich 
2013, no. 447, p. 992. 
3 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien, RK Berichte aus dem Reich 5b, fol. 327r. 
4 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 96, p. 388. 
5 Hendrik Mäkeler: Reichsmünzwesen im späten Mittelalter, Part 1: Das 14. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart 2010, p. 215; 
idem: A New Perspective on the Imperial Coinage, in: Roman Zaoral (ed.): Money and Finance in Central Eu-
rope during the Later Middle Ages. London 2016, pp. 25–31. 
6 For the policies aimed at creating a common currency since the early 15th century see Thomas Christmann: 
Das Bemühen von Kaiser und Reich um die Vereinheitlichung des Münzwesens: Zugleich ein Beitrag zum 
Rechtssetzungsverfahren im Heiligen Römischen Reich nach dem Westfälischen Frieden. Berlin 1988, pp. 37–
42. 
7 August Kluckhohn (ed.): Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V., vol. 1. Gotha 1893, no. 387, p. 874. 
lished a currency ordinance that aimed at achieving this.8 However, it had done this in the 
emperor’s absence and without consulting the Imperial Diet. Neither Charles V nor the major-
ity of the estates recognised the ordinance, far less enforced it. 
Now, in the 1550s, the situation had changed. When the chancellor of the elector of Mainz 
claimed that no-one had ever authorised the publication of the Imperial currency bill, he was 
not entirely correct. The Augsburg Diet of 1550-51 had discussed the bill and asked the em-
peror to make it public. He was to do this immediately after a comprehensive so-called valua-
tion: a metallurgical analysis of old coins and money minted outside the Empire that was to 
determine at what value these units were to continue in circulation until sufficient new coins 
had been minted to replace them.9 Charles followed the Diet’s request to the letter. The valua-
tion took place in spring 1551 in Nuremberg; its final report was submitted at the end of 
May,10 and in late July the emperor published the bill. Still, as will become clear, the chancel-
lor of Mainz did not quite pluck his argument out of thin air. His master had reasons to com-
plain, as had the electors of Trier, Cologne and of the Palatinate. Why this was the case – 
why, in other words, Charles V’s currency bill met with so much resistance – is the question 
at the heart of this article. The analysis focuses on the dispute about whether a bimetallic cur-
rency should be introduced, i.e. a monetary system where the ratio of gold and silver coins 
was fixed by law and where coins made of both metals were legal tender.11 The investigation 
also sheds light on what constituted Ferdinand I’s achievement: Unlike Charles V, he man-
aged to generate broad consent for a fundamentally revised version of the currency bill that 
became effective in 1559. This new bill was to prove so successful that it shaped the Empire’s 
monetary system until the late 18th century. 
The core of this article is formed by two structural sections (4 and 5). They introduce the par-
ties dominating the discussions about monetary reform in the decade between 1549 and 1559, 
focusing on their aims and their underlying motives. These sections are framed by two others 
that discuss historical events: Section 3 explains how the process of reform gained momentum 
in the second half of the 1540s and how decision making was organised, while section 6 fol-
lows the further development of monetary policies until the passage of the currency bill of 
                                                          
8 The Esslingen currency ordinance of 10 Nov. 1524 is printed in Heinrich Christian von Senckenberg / Johann 
Jacob Schmauß (eds.): Neue und vollständigere Sammlung der Reichs-Abschiede, vol. 2. Frankfurt 1747, pp. 
261–269 and Hirsch: Münz-Archiv (see n. 1), no. CLXVII, pp. 240–248. 
9 Erwein Eltz (ed.): Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1550/51, vol. 2. 
Munich 2005, no. 305, p. 1590. 
10 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 88, pp. 318–342. 
11 Cf. Friedrich Zellfelder: Bimetallismus, in: Michael North (ed.): Von Aktie bis Zoll: Ein historisches Lexikon 
des Geldes. Munich 1995, p. 56; François R. Velde / Warren E. Weber: A Model of Bimetallism, in: Journal of 
Political Economy 108 (2000), pp. 1210–1234, here 1210 f. 
1559. First, however, the current state of research and the sources on which the present article 
is based are described (section 2). A conclusion (section 7) summarises the main findings. 
2.  Literature and sources 
Much of the literature on the creation of a common Imperial currency in the sixteenth century 
stands in the shadow of Friedrich Freiherr von Schrötter’s work.12 About a century ago, 
Schrötter was the first to advance the core hypothesis that has since dominated research.13 
According to him, the Empire’s monetary policy was shaped by the clash of interests between 
those estates who controlled their own silver mines and those who did not. Fritz Blaich adopt-
ed this view, and large sections of the more recent literature followed him.14 It is this clash 
that is generally regarded as the main cause of the perceived failure of the Empire’s currency 
laws – i.e. not only of the ordinance of 1524 but of the bills in the 1550s, too.15  
Concerning the bill of 1551, research stresses an additional factor: the rate it set for the taler. 
The estates who issued this widely popular coin – most importantly the Saxon Elector Mau-
rice – are thought to have considered this rate as too low and as such they refused to cooperate 
in implementing the bill.16 An alternative explanation Petr Vorel suggested some years ago 
emphasises political factors, too. According to Vorel, the clash between estates with and 
                                                          
12 For the Empire’s 16th-century monetary policies see Friedrich Freiherr von Schrötter: Das Münzwesen des 
deutschen Reichs von 1500–1566, Teil I, in: Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und 
Volkswirtschaft 35 (1911), pp. 129–172; idem: Das Münzwesen des deutschen Reichs von 1500–1566, Teil II, 
in: Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft 36 (1912), pp. 99–128; Fritz Blaich: 
Die Wirtschaftspolitik des Reichstags im Heiligen Römischen Reich: Ein Beitrag zur Problemgeschichte 
wirtschaftlichen Gestaltens. Stuttgart 1970, pp. 9–66; Herbert Rittmann: Deutsche Geldgeschichte 1484–1914. 
Munich 1975, pp. 185–208; Christmann: Vereinheitlichung des Münzwesens (see n. 6), esp. pp. 72–88; Bernd 
Sprenger: Das Geld der Deutschen: Geldgeschichte Deutschlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Pader-
born et al. 2002, pp. 96–105; Konrad Schneider: Reichsmünzordnungen, in: Michael North (ed.): Von Aktie bis 
Zoll (see n. 11), pp. 336–338; Petr Vorel: Monetary Circulation in Central Europe at the Beginning of the Early 
Modern Age: Attempts to Establish a Shared Currency as an Aspect of the Political Culture of the 16th Century 
(1524–1573). Pardubice 2006, passim; Michael North: Geld- und Ordnungspolitik im Alten Reich, in: Anja 
Amend-Traut / Albrecht Cordes / Wolfgang Sellert (eds.): Geld, Handel, Wirtschaft: Höchste Gerichte im Alten 
Reich als Spruchkörper und Institution. Berlin / Boston 2013, pp. 93–101, here 93 ff.; Oliver Volckart: Die 
Reichsmünzordnung von 1559: Das Scheitern reichseinheitlichen Geldes, in: Dieter Lindenlaub / Carsten 
Burhop / Joachim Scholtyseck (eds.): Schlüsselereignisse der deutschen Bankengeschichte. Stuttgart 2013, pp. 
26–37, passim; for specific phases or aspects of these policies: Schrötter: Münzwesen, Teil II (see n. 12); Hans-
Wolfgang Bergerhausen: “Exclusis Westphalen et Burgundt”: Zum Kampf um die Durchsetzung der 
Reichsmünzordnung von 1559, in: Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 20 (1993), pp. 189–203; Oliver 
Volckart: Power Politics and Princely Debts: Why Germany’s Common Currency Failed, 1549–1556, in: 
Economic History Review 70 (2017), pp. 758–778. 
13 Cf. the literature survey in Volckart: Die Reichsmünzordnung von 1559 (see n. 12), pp. 27 f. 
14 Blaich: Wirtschaftspolitik (see n. 12), p. 19. 
15 Christmann: Vereinheitlichung des Münzwesens (see n. 6), pp. 90 f. 
16 Rittmann: Deutsche Geldgeschichte (see n. 12), p. 198; Christmann: Vereinheitlichung des Münzwesens (see 
n. 6), p. 71; Michael North: Von der atlantischen Handelsexpansion bis zu den Agrarreformen 1450–1815, in: 
idem (ed.): Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Ein Jahrtausend im Überblick. Munich 2001, pp. 107–191, here 
173; Vorel: Monetary Circulation (see n. 12), p. 92. 
without silver mines lost much of its previous importance in the 1540s, when bullion from the 
New World started to reach Europe. Charles V’s currency bill failed neither because of this 
nor because it rated the taler too low; rather, it failed because the emperor was politically too 
weak to force the multitude of parties resisting the creation of a common currency to cooper-
ate.17  
What much of prior research has in common is its reliance on essentially the same primary 
sources that were used already by Schrötter.18 By now, however, it has become possible to 
access far more material. Since the turn of the century, the publication of the acts of the Impe-
rial Diets has advanced rapidly.19 Further sources have been published in a recent volume in 
the ‘Deutsche Handelsakten des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit’-series that focuses on monetary 
politics:20 It makes available the effectively complete records of the currency conference of 
Summer 1557 in Speyer, some of whose participants were quoted at the start of this article, 
and of two other such conferences that also took place in Speyer in the year 1549. 
The present article uses these sources to examine the extent to which they bear out the widely 
accepted hypothesis that the failure of Charles V’s attempt to create a common currency in 
1551 was due to the electoral-Saxon resistance against the undervaluation of the taler or to the 
emperor’s inability to enforce his will vis-à-vis intransigent estates. The new sources allow 
demonstrating that neither of these problems were decisive, and that the most relevant issue 
was the creation of a bimetallic system. The analysis approaches the problem of bimetallism 
from a direction that differs from the one taken by much of modern research. There, the usual 
aim is to determine why and when bimetallic currencies were able to function despite changes 
in the relative market prices of gold and silver. Most studies refer to modern conditions; Brit-
ain’s adoption of the Gold Standard since the 18th century and France’s bimetallic currency in 
                                                          
17 Vorel: Monetary Circulation (see n. 12), pp. 56, 129, 133. 
18 Both the collection and analysis of post-1560 sources have advanced, though. Most research in this field 
concerned the role the Imperial circles played in implementing the currency bill of 1559; cf. Hans-Jürgen 
Gerhard: Ein schöner Garten ohne Zaun: Die währungspolitische Situation des Deutschen Reiches um 1600, in: 
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 81 (1994), pp. 156–177. Much of this research was done 
in the context of a project funded by the Volkswagen foundation in the 1990s. Hans-Jürgen Gerhard: Ursachen 
und Folgen der Wandlungen im Währungssystem des Deutschen Reiches 1500–1625: Eine Studie zu den 
Hintergründen der sogenannten Preisrevolution, in: Eckart Schremmer (ed.): Geld und Währung vom 16. 
Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. Stuttgart 1993, pp. 69–84. For the recent re-evaluation of the Empire’s monetary 
policies see Michael North: The Reception of Imperial Monetary Reforms in 16th-century Northern Germany, 
in: Roman Zaoral (ed.): Money and Finance (see n.5), pp. 32–41. 
19 Important in the present context: Rosemarie Aulinger (ed.): Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: 
Der Reichstag zu Worms 1545, vols. 1–2. Munich 2003; Ursula Machoczek (ed.): Deutsche Reichstagsakten 
unter Kaiser Karl V.: Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1547/48, vols. 1–3. Munich 2006; Eltz (ed.): Der Reichstag zu 
Augsburg 1550/51, vols. 1-2 (see n. 9); Leeb (ed.): Der Reichstag zu Regensburg 1556/57, vols. 1-2 (see n. 2). 
Hirsch’s ‘Münz-Archiv’ that appeared between 1756 and 1761 is still not entirely outdated. Hirsch: Münz-
Archiv, vols. 1–7 (see n. 1). 
20 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1). 
the first half of the 19th century are popular topics.21 Whether and how bimetallic currencies 
functioned in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period is a question that seems to 
have been as under-analysed as who was interested in such a currency for what reasons, and 
who was not. The latter question is addressed here. 
3. Agents, institutions and the momentum of reform 
After it had become evident that the currency ordinance published by the Imperial Governing 
Council in 1524 would never come into force, the creation of a common currency valid in the 
whole Empire remained on the program of practically every Imperial Diet. Initially it proved 
impossible to reach an agreement. However, Charles V’s success in the Schmalkaldic War, 
his capture of Landgrave Philip of Hesse and of the Saxon Elector John Frederick, and his 
transfer of the electorship to Maurice of Saxony changed the Empire’s political landscape. 
Charles intended to strike while the iron was hot. Next to his plan of reforming the Empire’s 
constitution and breaking the Protestant-Catholic deadlock, the common currency project was 
at the top of his agenda. 
The Augsburg Diet of 1547-48 focused on the first and second issues. As for the third, all 
present agreed that the money used in the Empire was in urgent need of reform. However, 
they also agreed that a Diet was not a suitable forum to solve the problems this involved. As 
the councillors of Charles V put it a little later, experience had shown that it was impossible to 
reach a currency agreement within a Diet. The emperor, electors and other princes might be 
present but currency experts were normally not; moreover, there was usually so much else to 
discuss that no time was left for currency issues.22 In Augsburg, the emperor therefore sug-
gested convening a separate currency conference; electors and princes proposed Speyer as the 
venue and 2 February 1549 as the start date.23 The Diet gave this conference the most com-
prehensive mandate imaginable. The estates should send fully authorised expert councillors 
                                                          
21 Cf. Angela Redish: The Evolution of the Gold Standard in England, in: Journal of Economic History 50 
(1990), pp. 789–805; eadem: The Persistence of Bimetallism in Nineteenth-Century France, in: Economic Histo-
ry Review 48 (1995), pp. 717–736; eadem: Bimetallism: An Economic and Historical Analysis. Cambridge / 
New York 2000; Velde / Weber: A Model (see n. 11), passim; Marc Flandreau: Adjusting to the Gold Rush: 
Endogenous Bullion Points and the French Balance of Payments, in: Explorations in Economic History 33 
(1996), pp. 417–439; idem: As Good as Gold? Bimetallism in Equilibrium, 1850–70, in: Maria Cristina Marcuz-
zo / Lawrence H. Officer / Annalisa Roselli (eds.): Monetary Standards and Exchange Rates. London / New 
York 1997, pp. 150–176; idem: “Water Seeks Level”: Modelling Bimetallic Exchange Rates and the Bimetallic 
Band, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 34 (2002), pp. 491–519; Claude Diebolt / Antoine Parent: Bi-
metallism: The “Rules of the Game”, in: Explorations in Economic History 45 (2008), pp. 288–302; Pilar 
Nogues-Marco: Competing Bimetallic Ratios: Amsterdam, London, and Bullion Arbitrage in the Mid-Eighteenth 
Century, in: Journal of Economic History 73 (2013), pp. 445–476. 
22 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 86, p. 305. 
23 Machoczek (ed.): Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1547/48, vol. 3 (see n. 19), no. 226, p. 2021. 
who should then not only draft a bill for a currency valid in the whole Empire, but should also 
independently pass this bill. It was to be binding without any further involvement of a Diet.24 
The councillors met as planned in February 1549. However, the conference was soon deferred 
to September, and it was this second meeting of the year 1549 that proved decisive. 
Organisationally, the coinage conference of autumn 1549 copied an Imperial Diet, albeit at a 
smaller scale. Also, only one estate – Count Ladislas of Haag – was personally present. The 
emperor was represented by two commissioners, that is, by Philip von Flersheim, who was 
bishop of Speyer, and Count Reinhard of Solms. The electors, the other princes and the free 
and imperial cities sent delegates, for whom the sources mostly use the term ‘councillors and 
envoys’ (Räte und Gesandten). Most of these were princely and urban officials, with universi-
ty-educated lawyers playing a large role. Mint masters and assayers – that is, technical offi-
cials involved in the production of coins, who were considered experts in monetary matters – 
were also present.25 Some estates sent several delegates. As archduke of Austria King Ferdi-
nand, for example, was represented by the vice chancellor of his court Jacob Jonas and by 
Thomas Behaim, who was director of the Austrian mints. Others sent joint delegates: George 
Boss, for instance, who was mint master of the Teutonic Order in Mergentheim, also acted on 
behalf of the bishops of Würzburg and Constance. The free and imperial cities had ‘in com-
mon’ (that is, acting jointly as one of the three Councils forming the Imperial Diet) authorised 
six cities to stand for them; this group of six, in turn, had chosen Nuremberg and Ulm as rep-
resentatives.26 In fact, Nuremberg’s and Ulm’s envoys were accompanied by those of a num-
ber of other, mostly South-German cities. Altogether, the 40 delegates present at the coinage 
conference that began in September 1549 acted on behalf of 109 estates of the Empire. 
As on an Imperial Diet, the delegates formed three Councils – the Electors’, the Princes’ and 
the Cities’ Councils – that negotiated separately and whose members had to first agree among 
each other before attempting to reach a common resolution. Within the Councils, majority 
decisions were considered valid;27 in the relations between councils, where, for example, the 
Electors’ and Cities’ Councils were unable to outvote the princes’ council, this was not the 
case.28 In any case, the influence of the Cities’ Council was as restricted as on an Imperial 
                                                          
24 Ibid., no. 372b, pp. 2664 f. 
25 For the participants see the table in Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), pp. LXXXVII-XCVIII.. 
26 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 81, pp. 276 f. 
27 Ibid., no. 49, p. 195. 
28 The Elector’s and Cities’ Councils both opposed a bimetallic currency but were unable to force the Princes’ 
Council to adopt their stance. Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 37, pp. 125 f., 131 f. 
Diet.29 Thus, between 13 September and 5 November 1549, the Electors’ and the Princes’ 
Councils met almost daily for plenary sessions. The Cities’ council never took part, though its 
members were updated irregularly about the results of the talks.30  
The delegates of the cities nevertheless had a chance to influence proceedings. First, multiple 
representations such as those mentioned above meant that some envoys sat in several coun-
cils. Hans Steinhauser, for example, the treasurer of the Upper Palatinate, was sent by the 
elector of the Palatinate but at the same time acted on behalf of the provost of Selz and the 
Imperial City of Gelnhausen. Likewise, Hieronymus Ainkürn represented the elector and the 
Free City of Cologne concurrently. The city of Cologne’s other delegate, Caspar Gropper, 
was also the envoy of the city of Dortmund and the duke of Jülich, Cleves and Berg.31 Under 
such conditions it seems likely that the Cities’ Council learnt quickly and regularly what was 
going on in the other Councils. Moreover, urban delegates did take part in discussions – if not 
in the plenary sessions then in the committees formed to solve particularly tricky problems.32 
There was only one such committee where they were not represented; in all others, two en-
voys of Nuremberg, Strasbourg or Ulm were present. Still, as the other two councils sent be-
tween nine and eleven delegates, those of the cities were easily outvoted. 
This was important because committee decisions reflected majority views. Verdicts were 
reached in a questioning process similar to that practiced on Imperial Diets: In most cases, 
one of the delegates of Mainz proposed the topic to be discussed. Then, the other committee 
members stated their views in order of rank, with the delegates of the electors of Trier, Co-
logne, the Palatinate and Brandenburg speaking first. Mainz closed the list of electoral voices. 
Among the princely councillors, those of the archduke of Austria ranked highest; the envoys 
of Bavaria, Burgundy, Jülich, Cleves and Berg and of the Wetterau counts followed. The cit-
ies, represented by the delegates of Nuremberg and Ulm, brought up the rear. Many, but by no 
means all, committee members briefly stated why they voted as they did.33 Decisions were 
based on the majority of all votes cast, irrespective of the status or rank of the voter.34 The 
process allowed Mainz much leverage as its delegates could at the same time set the agenda 
and adapt their position to that of the representatives of the electors of Trier, Cologne, the 
                                                          
29 Cf. Albrecht Luttenberger: Reichspolitik und Reichstag unter Karl V.: Formen zentralen politischen Handelns, 
in: Heinrich Lutz / Alfred Kohler (eds.): Aus der Arbeit an den Reichstagen unter Kaiser Karl V.: 7 Beiträge zu 
Fragen der Forschung und Edition. Göttingen 1986, pp. 16–68, here 29 ff. 
30 On 13, 18, 22, 24 and 28 September and on 4, 19 and 26 October 1549: Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 
37, pp. 107, 114, 118, 131, 139, 161, 169. 
31 Ibid., no. 57, pp. 222 f. 
32 Ibid., no. 37, pp. 114, 139. 
33 Ibid., no. 37, pp. 140 f. 
34 Cf. Klaus Schlaich: Die Mehrheitsabstimmung im Reichstag zwischen 1495 und 1613, in: idem (ed.): 
Gesammelte Aufsätze: Kirche und Staat von der Reformation bis zum Grundgesetz. Tübingen 1997, pp. 135–
178, here 153 f. The draft of the currency bill: Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 55, pp. 223–236. 
Palatinate and Brandenburg. Flersheim and Solms, the Imperial commissioners, enjoyed far 
less formal influence, neither chairing any plenary or council sessions nor taking part in 
committee talks. Normally, their role was to receive written communications from the three 
Councils and to urge the delegates to reach an agreement. However, while Flersheim had 
carefully preserved his neutrality when acting as Imperial commissioner during a chamber 
court audit some years earlier,35 he and Solms now explicitly acted in Charles V’s interest. 
Below, this will become evident. 
The constitutional status of the currency conference convened in 1557 to prepare the reform 
of Charles V’s aborted project differed fundamentally from that of the earlier meeting. Its 
mandate was simply to draft proposals that were to be submitted to the following Imperial 
Diet. Formally, it matched a Deputation Diet (Reichsdeputationstag), a type of Imperial as-
sembly that the Executive Ordinance (Reichsexekutionsordnung) of 1555 had created and that 
formalised the cross-Council committees which many Imperial Diets had formed since the 
1520s.36 Indeed, the Saxon Elector August – Maurice’s successor – simply called the confer-
ence a committee meeting.37 Unlike in 1549, the deputies did not form three Councils but dis-
cussed all matters jointly.38 The royal commissioners Johann Ulrich Zasius and Hans Philip 
Schad von Mittelbiberach did not take part but reacted to written communications and tried to 
keep the talks going. 
4. The lure of silver 
Like the Imperial Diets since the 1520s, the currency conference of spring 1549 initially fo-
cused on the question of the silver mint price, i.e. of the price at which the mints of the estates 
should purchase their bullion.39 By autumn, this issue had disappeared from the agenda.40 
                                                          
35 Annette Baumann: Visitationen des Reichskammergerichts: Akteure und Handlungsspielräume, in: eadem / 
Kemper, Joachim (eds.): Speyer als Hauptstadt des Reiches: Politik und Justiz zwischen Reich und Territorium 
im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, Berlin / Boston 2016, pp. 68–84, here 83. 
36 Rosemarie Aulinger / Erwein Eltz / Ursula Machoczek (ed.): Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V.: 
Der Reichstag zu Augsburg 1555, vol. 4. Munich 2009, no. 390, p. 3126; Helmut Neuhaus: Reichsständische 
Repräsentationsformen im 16. Jahrhundert: Reichstag – Reichskreistag – Reichsdeputationstag. Berlin 1982, pp. 
18 f. 
37 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 92, p. 377. 
38 There are no minutes but the report the Saxon deputies sent home suggests that e.g. the deputies of Salzburg, 
Jülich, Cleve and Berg and of other estates directly answered those of the representatives of Electoral-Cologne, 
the Palatinate and Mainz. Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 96, p. 386–391.  
39 For the importance of the mint price (16th-century sources use the term Silberkauf) in the context of premod-
ern minting see John D. Gould: The Great Debasement: Currency and the Economy in Mid-Tudor England. 
Oxford 1970, p. 8, and more formally Thomas J. Sargent / François R. Velde: The Big Problem of Small 
Change. Princeton / Oxford 2002, p. 23. 
40 There is no direct primary evidence for why this issue disappeared. At least in part, a report of the currency 
committee at the Diet of Worms in 1545 seems to have been responsible. The committee had stated that any 
dispute about the mint price of silver was futile given that mints used silver coins to purchase raw silver. The 
Now, the delegates spent most of their time and energy discussing whether the Empire should 
introduce a bimetallic currency. The backdrop of their talks was the changing relative price of 
gold and silver. Since the start of the 16th century, the mines in the Ore Mountains and in the 
Tyrol, in Bohemia and Upper Hungary were regularly producing between 30 and 50 tons of 
pure silver per year; in addition, since the mid-1540s imports from the New World started to 
grow.41 Neither domestic output nor gold imports seem to have kept pace with these figures. 
In consequence, the value of silver dropped almost everywhere while in relative terms gold 
became more expensive. 
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quantity of silver bought with each coin was larger the quantity contained in the coin, but the value of this differ-
ence could not exceed what was needed to cover the rest of the production costs. The argument was valid. While 
nominal mint prices might diverge widely across markets, differences between prices expressed in bullion 
moved between narrow bounds. When the issue of the mint price re-surfaced briefly in summer 1557, the depu-
ties of Trier quoted the currency committee report of 1545, which might be of use particularly to those inexperi-
enced in monetary matters: ‘It would truly help to disclose this to all deputies at this conference’. Volckart (ed.): 
Währung (see n. 1), no. 99, p. 402. The committee report of 1545: Aulinger (ed.): Der Reichstag zu Worms 
1545, vol. 2 (see n. 19), no. 86, pp. 947 f.; the punctuation modernised by the editor distorts the sense of the 
passage. 
41 John H. Munro: The Monetary Origins of the ‘Price Revolution’: South German Silver Mining, Merchant-
Banking, and Venetian Commerce, 1470–1540, in: Dennis O. Flynn / Arturo Giráldez / Richard von Glahn 
(eds.): Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470–1800. Aldershot / Brookfield 2003, pp. 1–34, here 8; 
Renate Pieper: Amerikanische Edelmetalle in Europa (1492–1621): Ihr Einfluß auf die Verwendung von Gold 
und Silber, in: Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 32 (1995), pp. 
163–191, here 168. 
42 For Augsburg, Hamburg and Vienna calculated on the basis of the exchange rate of the rhinegulden and the 
bullion content of Rhine gulden and the largest local silver coin minted. Exchange rates: Augsburg: Benedikt 
Greiff: Tagebuch des Lucas Rem aus den Jahren 1494–1541: Ein Beitrag zur Handelsgeschichte der Stadt 
Augsburg. Augsburg 1861, p. 62; Friedrich Blendinger / Elfriede Blendinger (eds.): Zwei Augsburger 
Unterkaufbücher aus den Jahren 1551 bis 1558: Älteste Aufzeichnungen zur Vor- und Frühgeschichte der 
Augsburger Börse. Stuttgart 1994, passim; Karl Otto Müller (ed.): Quellen zur Handelsgeschichte der 
Paumgartner von Augsburg (1480–1570). Wiesbaden 1955, pp. 26, 240; Peter Geffken / Mark Häberlein (eds.): 
Rechnungsfragmente der Augsburger Welser-Gesellschaft (1496–1551): Oberdeutscher Fernhandel am Beginn 
der neuzeitlichen Weltwirtschaft. Stuttgart 2014, pp. 105–207; Hamburg: Karl Koppmann: 
Kämmereirechnungen der Stadt Hamburg, vols. 5–7. Hamburg 1883–1894, passim; Vienna: Carl Schalk: Der 
Wiener Münzverkehr im 16. Jahrhundert, in: Numismatische Zeitschrift 13 (1881), pp. 243–329, here 261 f.; 
idem, Der Wiener Münzverkehr im XVI. Jahrhundert, in: Numismatische Zeitschrift 16 (1884), pp. 89–108, here 
91 f. Bullion contents: Augsburg, Vienna: Johann Newald: Das österreichische Münzwesen unter Ferdinand I.: 
Eine münzgeschichtliche Studie. Wien 1883, pp. 131 f.; Hirsch: Münz-Archiv (see n. 1), no. CLXXXIII, pp. 268 
f.; Hamburg: Wilhelm Jesse: Der Wendische Münzverein. Lübeck 1928, p. 211; Rhine gulden: Karl 
Weisenstein: Das Kurtriersche Münz- und Geldwesen vom Beginn des 14. bis zum Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts: 
Auch ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Rheinischen Münzvereins. Koblenz 1995, pp. 106, 140. The gold-silver 
ratio at Cologne: Rainer Metz: Geld, Währung und Preisentwicklung: Der Niederrheinraum im europäischen 
Vergleich 1350–1800. Frankfurt 1990, pp. 369–374. Legal ratios: Johann Georg von Lori: Sammlung des 
baierischen Münzrechts, vol. 1. n.p. 1768, no. CXCV, p. 224; Newald: Münzwesen (as above), p. 113; Blending-
er / Blendinger (eds.): Unterkaufbücher (as above), p. 33; for the ratio planned in Speyer see the draft of the 
currency bill (11 Oct. 1549): Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 58, p. 223–236. 
In 1549, the question of whether a legally fixed ratio between gold and silver coins should be 
introduced was by no means new. The Esslingen currency ordinance of 1524 had tried to es-
tablish such a system, and the coinage committee formed at the Diet of Worms in 1545 had 
recommended a bimetallic currency too.43 In Speyer, in 1549, it was the Imperial commis-
sioners Flersheim and Solms who first brought up the topic. At the end of September, they 
suggested that a silver 72-kreuzers piece should be minted. The value of this coin was to 
match that of the traditionally most popular and widely used gold coin, the Rhine gulden, 
which the electors of Mainz, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate issued and which many other 
estates imitated. The commissioners’ choice of a face value of 72 kreuzers seems to have tak-
en conditions in Bohemia and South Germany into account. In 1542, King Ferdinand had 
fixed the Rhine gulden at this value, two years later the Bohemian estates followed suit, and 
in 1547 the city of Augsburg had done the same.44 What was new in 1549 was the fact that 
Flersheim and Solms explicitly stressed what a system where gold and silver coins circulated 
in parallel and at fixed rates implied: They pointed out that ‘everyone entitled to receive gold 
should be obliged without any refusal to accept the [silver] 72-kreuzers piece in lieu of a 
Rhine gulden’.45  
None of the councillors and envoys of the estates seems to have thought of this before. The 
representatives of the princes were enthusiastic: Their written response, which they submitted 
to the commissioners after only two days, argued that it would be impossible to come to a 
fruitful conclusion without introducing the obligation to accept silver in place of gold.46 This 
was because of the increase in the price of gold and in the exchange rate of gold coins: It 
forced anybody who had to service liabilities denominated in Rhine guldens to purchase the 
gold he needed at a price much higher than when the debts had been incurred. Hence, fixing 
the exchange rate of the Rhine gulden at 72 kreuzers was actually a concession: Even under 
that condition, ‘debtors or their heirs, who years ago had taken out a loan in gold at a rate of 
                                                          
43 Hirsch: Münz-Archiv (see n. 1), no. CLXVII, p. 241; Aulinger (ed.): Der Reichstag zu Worms 1545, vol. 2 
(see n. 19), no. 81, p. 931, no. 86, p. 951. 
44 Lori: Sammlung, vol. 1 (see n. 42), no. CXCV, p. 224; Newald: Münzwesen (see n. 42), p. 113; Blendinger / 
Blendinger (eds.): Unterkaufbücher (see n. 42), p. 33. According to Vorel, 72 kreuzers were chosen as face value 
of the largest unit in order to bring the Imperial currency in line with that of Spain, whose units were ranked as 
multiples of 8. Vorel: Monetary Circulation (see n. 12), pp. 89 f. In 1519, Gattinara had indeed recommended 
harmonising the currencies of the dominions of Charles V. Karl Brandi: Kaiser Karl V: Werden und Schicksal 
einer Persönlichkeit und eines Weltreiches. Munich 1937, p. 98. However, there is no evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that this recommendation was taken into account during the drafting of the currency bill of 1551. The 
Spanish currency was never mentioned in the talks. The officials who took part on the valuation of old and for-
eign coins circulating in the Empire in spring 1551 did not treat the Spanish reales in any way differently from 
other foreign coins. They would certainly have done so had Spain played a special role for the reform. Volckart 
(ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 88, p. 339. 
45 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 50, p. 196. 
46 Ibid., no. 52, p. 201. 
merely 66, 64 and for many years only 60 of the kreuzers then current, had much more reason 
to complain […] than those who now receive 72 in place of 66, 64 or 60 kreuzers’. Hence, 
resistance against such a measure was neither justified nor to be expected.47  
This argument needs to be seen in the context of the financial position of many of the princes 
of the Empire. In the early 1560s, Ferdinand I’s revenues are estimated at 970,000 florins per 
annum. He had to earmark about half of this for servicing his total debts of c. 7.8 million flor-
ins (a debt to revenue ratio of 8.0 to 1).48 At about the same time, Landgrave Philip of Hesse 
had yearly revenues of somewhat less than 101,000 florins, while the stock of his debts was 
985,000 florins (a ratio of 8.9 to 1). Duke Ulrich of Württemberg’s income was about 125,000 
florins in 1550 – on the opposite side of his ledger was a debt stock of 1.7 million (13.7 to 
1).49 This list could be extended. However, suffice to say that as bishop of Speyer, Charles 
V’s commissioner at the currency conferences of 1549, Philip von Flersheim, had yearly rev-
enues of not quite 12,000 florins, 9,600 of which he needed to reserve for debt services.50  
What needs to be kept in mind is that in many parts of the Empire the florin was no more than 
a unit of account used for silver coins. In Austria, for example, the sum of 60 kreuzers was 
called a florin, in Saxony that of 21 Meißen groschens and in Brandenburg that of 32 
märkisch groschens.51 Debts listed in florins were therefore not necessarily denominated in 
gold. The size of the share of gold-denominated debts in the total debts held by Imperial es-
                                                          
47 Ibid., no. 52, p. 201, 203, 205. 
48 If the assumption is correct that the interest rate that applied to the floating debt was about equal to that for the 
funded debt, i.e. 6.3 per cent. Cf. Alfred Kohler: Ferdinand I. 1503–1564: Fürst, König und Kaiser. Munich 
2003, pp. 177, 182 f. 
49 Hessen: Kersten Krüger: Finanzstaat Hessen 1500–1567: Staatsbildung im Übergang vom Domänenstaat zum 
Steuerstaat. Marburg 1981, pp. 244, 295, 297; Württemberg: Rudolf Bütterlin: Die merkantilistische Geldpolitik 
im Herzogtum Württemberg von der Reformation bis Napoleon. Metzingen 1966, S. 25. Further examples: 
August Beck: Johann Friedrich der Mittlere, Herzog zu Sachsen: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des sechzehnten 
Jahrhunderts. Weimar 1858, pp. 64 f. (Sachsen-Weimar); generally Ernst Klein: Geschichte der öffentlichen 
Finanzen in Deutschland (1500–1870). Stuttgart 1974, pp. 18 f., Volker Press: Formen des Ständewesens in den 
deutschen Territorien des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, in: Ständetum und Staatsbildung in Brandenburg-Preußen: 
Ergebnisse einer internationalen Fachtagung. Berlin / New York 1983, pp. 280–318, here 292; Maximilian 
Lanzinner: Friedenssicherung und politische Einheit des Reiches unter Kaiser Maximilian II. 1564–1576. Göt-
tingen 1993, pp. 173 f. The debts of German princes were high by international standards. The English Crown, 
for example, had a debt to revenue ratio of 0.8 to 1 at the death of Edward VI and of 0.9 to 1 at the coronation of 
Elizabeth I. On the other hand, early modern Italian states had far larger debts than any prince of the Empire. 
Thus, in about 1500 the Republic of Genoa’s accumulated stock of debt was 35 times the size of its annual reve-
nues. By 1700, Venice and the Papacy had debt to revenue ratios of, respectively, 15 and 20 to 1. English Reve-
nues: P.K. O’Brien and P.A. Hunt, European State Finance Database 
(http://www.esfdb.org/table.aspx?resourceid=11226, accessed 20 February 2017). English debts: David Loades: 
The Mid-Tudor Crisis, 1545–1565. London 1992, pp. 64, 68. Italian data: David Chilosi: Risky Institutions: 
Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy, in: Journal of Economic History 74, 
3 (2014), pp. 887–915, here 897 f. 
50 Generallandesarchiv (henceforth: GLA) Karlsruhe 78/1638 (unpaginated). 
51 Alfred Nagl: Das Tiroler Geldwesen unter Erzherzog Sigismund und die Entstehung des Silberguldens, in: 
Numismatische Zeitschrift 38 (1906), pp. 45–168, here 88; Walter Schwinkowski: Das Geld- und Münzwesen 
Sachsens, in: Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte 38 (1917), pp. 140–181 and 355–395, here 160; Emil 
Bahrfeld: Das Münzwesen der Mark Brandenburg unter den Hohenzollern bis zum grossen Kurfürsten, von 1415 
bis 1640. Berlin 1895, p. 178. 
tates in the 16th century is an issue research has so far failed to address. However, two exam-
ples may serve to illustrate the situation. In 1529, Otto von Estorff, one of the vassals of Ern-
est the Confessor of Brunswick-Lüneburg, stood surety for altogether 41 loans taken up by the 
duke. 15 of these were denominated in gold guldens; they made up more than a quarter of the 
total sum.52 The structure of Flersheim’s own debts is shown in a ‘summary of all the bishop-
ric of Speyer’s revenues’ that the treasurer compiled in 1542 and which condenses the fiscal 
situation of the preceding decade:53 While only 3.5 per cent of the debts that Flersheim inher-
ited from his predecessor in 1529 were denominated in gold, almost two-thirds of those he 
incurred himself until the early 1540s were in gold and had to be serviced with gold. 
The difference between these values prohibits generalisations. What is obvious, though, is that 
a bimetallic currency favoured debtors as long as they were able on the one hand to purchase 
the coins they needed to service their obligations at exchange rates close to the market price 
of gold or silver, and on the other hand to compel their creditors to accept these coins at their 
legal value. Daily experience taught that official exchange rates were impossible to enforce on 
the markets of the Empire.54 At the same time, princes would very likely be able to force their 
creditors to respect Imperial law, including a law that determined the official ratio of gold and 
silver coins. Indebted princes would thus have the chance to choose that metal whose market 
price was lower than its official value determined in 1549 in order to service their gold-
denominated debts. It is no surprise that the princely councillors were delighted with 
Flersheim’s proposal, and it will not surprise either that the envoys of the Free and Imperial 
Cities – many of which were creditors of princes – opposed it.55  
                                                          
52 24 further loans of Duke Ernest were denominated in florins, that is, probably in the locally common unit of 
account ‘St Mary’s florin’ (à 20 silver St Mary’s groschen). Two were denominated in ‘mark’, i.e. in the Mark 
Lübisch current in Lüneburg. Assuming that the value of the St Mary’s florin was roughly the same as that of the 
Austrian silver florin, i.e. about 0.9 Rhine gulden, and that Rhine gulden rate was about 1.8 Mark Lübisch (28.2 
shillings, see the evidence cited in n. 42, Estorff stood surety for debts of a value of altogether c. 126,000 Rhine 
guldens. The share denominated in gold had a value of 24,700 florins. [Cammerjunker] von Estorff: Beitrag zur 
Finanzgeschichte des welfischen Fürstenhauses in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts mit besonderer 
Beziehung auf die Familien von Estorff, in: Vaterländisches Archiv des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen 4 
(1836), pp. 397–442, here 402–409. 
53 GLA Karlsruhe 78/1638 (not foliated). 
54 Philipp Robinson Rössner: Deflation – Devaluation – Rebellion: Geld im Zeitalter der Reformation. Stuttgart 
2012, pp. 566 f. 
55 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 37, p. 131, no. 52, pp. 198–206. Cf. Lukas Winder: Die Kreditgeber 
der österreichischen Habsburger 1521–1612: Versuch einer Gesamtanalyse, in: Peter Rauscher / Andrea Serles / 
Thomas Winkelbauer (eds.): Das “Blut des Staatskörpers”: Forschungen zur Finanzgeschichte der Frühen 
Neuzeit. Munich 2012, pp. 435–458, here 442. 
5. The Rhinegold   
The Cities did not stand alone. The electors on the Rhine, too, resolutely refused to accept the 
bimetallic system the Imperial commissioners put forward.56 In November 1549 they them-
selves turned directly to the emperor in order to convince him of their counterarguments.57 
Their memorandum listed three reasons why they opposed a bimetallic system. First, they 
pointed out that conventions and contracts were based, among other things, on natural law and 
on the law of nations. Anything the contracting parties had agreed therefore had to be ob-
served.58 The Rhenish electors did not only refer to the general legal tenet of pacta sunt 
servanda but to an argument made by the realist school of Scholasticism. This claimed that 
while debtors might repay their debts with other coins than those they had originally bor-
rowed, these coins had to be of the same type or exactly the same value.59 Forcing creditors to 
accept silver in lieu of gold without a hearing and against their will therefore meant violating 
their rights. Debtors who allowed this were not only damaging their reputation but had to ex-
pect resistance and even feuds and rioting.60  
A bimetallic currency would of course not have prevented the electors on the Rhine from sat-
isfying their creditors in a way that took the realist position on usury into account: They 
would still have been able to repay those of their debts denominated in gold with gold coins, 
thereby avoiding the perils of which they warned. However, they expected further disad-
vantages. Their second argument claimed that under the standard of the planned new Imperial 
silver coinage, one mark of gold did no longer equal twelve, but only eleven marks of silver. 
In other words, gold would be undervalued and therefore exported to neighbouring countries 
where its value was higher.61 The argument was sound. While in many places the value of the 
Rhine gulden was already 72 kreuzers, these were kreuzers struck according to the Austrian 
standard of 1535. The rate implied a gold-silver ratio of 1:11.84. If the Rhine gulden was 
equated with 72 kreuzers of the new standard planned in Speyer, the ratio dropped to 1:10.64 
(cf. Figure 1).62 At the same time, the ratio at the Paris mint was 1:11.65.63 Accordingly, the 
                                                          
56 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 51, p. 198. 
57 Ibid., no. 84, p. 281–300 
58 Ibid., no. 84, p. 283. 
59 John Munro: The Medieval Origins of the ’Financial Revolution’: Usury, Rentes, and Negotiablity, in: Inter-
national History Review 25 (2003), pp. 506–562, here 510 f. 
60 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 84, p. 285. 
61 Ibid., no. 84, pp. 286 f. 
62 As the share of pure silver was lower in small change than in larger coins, gold silver ratios also depended on 
which silver units were exchanged for the Rhine gulden. The ratios were  
1 Rhine gulden = 72 Austrian 1-kreuzer pieces (standard of 1535):                 1:11.84. 
1 Rhine gulden = 1.2 Austrian silver guldens (à 60 kreuzers, standard of 1535):  1:12.24. 
1 Rhine gulden = 72 1-kreuzer pieces (as planned in Speyer in autumn 1549):  1:10.64. 
value of gold in the Empire would have been about 9 per cent lower than in Paris. The differ-
ence would probably have been so sufficient to cover the costs of exporting the metal and 
reminting it abroad. As the Rhenish electors pointed out, the result would be that ‘the com-
mon weal would be weakened and the property and income of both the high- and low-ranking 
members of this nation destroyed, which would cast the German nation in comparison with its 
neighbours into eternal poverty’ – a conclusion that seemed obvious if one equated a coun-
try’s stock of bullion with its wealth.64  
Finally, the electors on the Rhine stressed the vagaries of mining which could cause sudden 
changes in the value of silver and made any attempt to establish a stable ratio to gold futile. 
Therefore, introducing cumbersome monetary innovations was pointless. What was even 
more important was that any currency law including such innovations would soon be outdat-
ed.65 The electors here anticipated an argument that long dominated thinking on bimetallic 
currencies. Changes in supply and demand and in the relative prices of gold and silver were 
seen as the Achilles heel of such systems. Older research assumed that consumers would ex-
ploit the legally determined ratio of gold and silver coins: They would react to a rise in the 
market price in one of the metals by culling coins minted from this metal, melting them and 
selling them as raw material. More recent studies have demonstrated that bimetallic currencies 
may still be stable. Only when the difference between the legal and the market ratios of the 
two metals is large enough to cover both the costs of melting those coins whose intrinsic val-
ue is rising, and of selling the metal, does the effort to cull these pieces pay.66 However, even 
then a shift in the relative prices of gold and silver did not necessarily cause one of the metals 
to disappear from circulation. If the local authority proves incapable of forcing consumers to 
use money at its legal face value, those coins whose intrinsic value rises are not withdrawn 
from circulation but traded at a premium.67 This possibility is something the delegates of the 
Rhenish Electors pointed out quite early in the talks.68  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Rhine gulden = 1 72-kreuzers piece (as planned in Speyer in autumn 1549):  1:10.88. 
Figure 1 shows the ratios based on the respective largest silver unit. Austrian currency bill of 1535: Hirsch, 
Münz-Archiv (see n. Error! Bookmark not defined.), no. CLXXXIII, pp. 268–271; the standard planned in 
Speyer according to the draft bill of 11 October 1549: Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. Error! Bookmark not 
defined.), no. 58, pp. 223–236. 
63 According to the French currency law of 1549, 1 golden écu effigie (à 540 deniers) equalled 4.1 silver testons 
(à 132 deniers). Jules-Adrien Blanchet / Adolphe Dieudonné: Manuel de numismatique Française, vol. 2: Mon-
naies royales Françaises depuis Hugues Capet jusqu’a la Révolution. Paris 1916, p. 323. 
64 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 84, p. 287. 
65 Ibid., no. 84, p. 287. 
66 Cf. Flandreau: “Water Seeks Level” (see n. 21), pp. 491 f., who quotes the relevant literature. 
67 Cf.. Redish, Bimetallism (see n. 21), pp. 30–33. 
68 Volckart (ed.): Währung (see n. 1), no. 37, p. 107. 
Charles V’s councillors drafted a counter memorandum where they addressed the Electors’ 
arguments point by point. They emphasised that a legal fiction allowed the assumption that 
coins used for repaying debts had the same value as those originally lent, in particular as the 
value of money was a function of its use rather than of its material (this was the nominalist 
position in the Scholastic debate about usury);69 they insisted that the official gold-silver ratio 
had been determined correctly and stressed that if this should change in future, the Emperor 
and the estates would be able to adjust the currency law.70 What Charles’ councillors did not 
mention was how inconsistent the position of the Rhenish electors was. In March 1549, it had 
been their delegates who first suggested introducing a silver 72-kreuzers piece that was to be 
the equivalent of the Rhine gulden – a policy that contradicted their later claim that the gulden 
would be undervalued at that rate.71  
It seems likely, therefore, that the electors on the Rhine were influenced by ulterior motives 
not mentioned in their memorandum of November 1549. Earlier arguments suggest what may 
have been at the back of their minds. Already at the Diet of Worms in 1545, their delegates 
had opposed a bimetallic currency. The Saxon Elector John Frederick had remarked on that 
occasion that this was because the duties payable at the custom posts on the Rhine were laid 
down in gold: The electors therefore faced serious losses if the increase in the value of gold 
came to an end.72 In fact, the proceedings at the electoral custom collection points seem to 
have been notorious. An expert report on monetary policies reveals the views of the propo-
nents of a fixed ratio between gold and silver coins, claiming that ‘when a boatman arrives at 
a custom post and complains about his lack of gold, and does not know where to obtain any, 
the customs officer knows how to advise him where to find it, and it may very well be that he, 
the officer, is involved in this trade and has gold himself’.73 Whether this kind of peculation 
did indeed occur or how common it was may be left open. In any case the requirement to pay 
gold is likely to have contributed to the relative abundance of gold in the Rhineland that Co-
logne’s low gold silver ratio reflects (see the Figure above). Once the ratio between the gold-
en florin and the silver 72-kreuzers piece was determined by law, however, merchants liable 
to pay custom duties had the chance to choose the metal whose market price was currently 
below its 1549 value. For obvious reasons, the Rhenish electors disliked this prospect. 
In Speyer, the electoral councillors themselves did not mention the custom posts on the Rhine. 
Had they done this they would have exposed themselves to accusations of selfishness. The 
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threat of gold being exported from the Empire was a perfectly plausible and far more appro-
priate argument, which they used early in the talks.74 The delegates of the princes, however, 
brought the customs issue up clearly enough.75 Flersheim and Solms, the Imperial commis-
sioners, left no doubt about who would be responsible should the talks fail: The electors on 
the Rhine, ‘who put their self-interest and their custom revenues first, neglecting the common 
weal’.76  
6. Pressure, obstruction and compromise 
In autumn 1549, the commissioners tried for several weeks to convince the electoral delegates 
of their point of view. Flersheim used his own situation as an example: He had to purchase the 
gold he owed with great hardship and at unbearable costs from merchants, and it was ‘insuf-
ferable that it should not be allowed to use silver instead’.77 The delegates remained unmoved. 
When Flersheim became irritated and referred to the Schmalkaldic war (‘it had been found 
how dangerous it was to diminish his Majesty’s reputation and dignity, as could easily be seen 
in the past war when his Majesty did not move against Saxony and Hesse for reasons of reli-
gion, but because of their disobedience’),78 this was to no avail either. The councillors of the 
Rhenish electors did not seriously expect Charles V to go to war over the exchange rate of the 
Rhine gulden. They got nervous, though, when it transpired in October that Solms had trav-
elled to the emperor’s court in Brussels to request an Imperial resolution: They were not 
aware that anyone had asked Solms to go to Brussels; and they themselves had never desired 
the emperor’s decision.79 The delegates of the electors were right to worry. When Flersheim’s 
co-commissioner returned in November, it turned out that a bimetallic currency was what 
Charles V wished. He had obtained a report of the Princes’ council that argued in favour of 
such a system and in which he had taken ‘gracious pleasure’.80 Now, he ordered his commis-
sioners to make sure that the estates obeyed his resolution and reached a decision now, at the 
current conference.81 In this, Flersheim and Solms failed. In Speyer the bimetallism issue re-
mained unresolved. 
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It was only at the next Imperial Diet at Augsburg 1550-51 that the Rhenish electors showed 
signs of giving in. Two days after the talks had started the envoys of the Palatinate declared 
that they were happy with the planned currency bill, while Trier stated that the draft prepared 
in Speyer should stand.82 On the face of it, this seems to have been the result of an increase in 
pressure from the emperor. Shortly before the diet was about to open, Flersheim and Solms 
had required the councillors of the electors of Mainz, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate to see 
them in their lodgings, prohibited them from seeking further council on matters of monetary 
policy, set them a deadline until which they had to agree to Charles V’s demand for a bimetal-
lic currency, and then sent them away – all this in a tone that was, to say the least, unusual in 
discussions between representatives of the head of the Empire and its highest-ranking es-
tates.83  
Still, if the pressure under which the electoral envoys found themselves contributed to their 
change of opinion, it is unlikely to have been the only reason. Probably, there was another 
underlying and more systematic cause to which the Austrian delegates pointed already at the 
currency conference of spring 1549. There, Jacob Jonas and Thomas Behaim had warned 
against deferring the talks: Leaving without an agreement and reconvening later would do 
more harm than good because ‘usually the matter is then taken up by new and mostly insuffi-
ciently experienced councillors and delegates who are poorly informed about the issues at 
hand‘.84 This is what happened in 1550. Only two of the delegates of the Rhenish electors 
who had rejected the plan of a bimetallic currency in Speyer were also present at the diet in 
Augsburg: One accompanied the Archbishop of Mainz, the other the one of Cologne – and 
these were the electors who seem to have stuck to their guns. By contrast, the electors of Trier 
and of the Palatinate were represented at the Diet by councillors who were new and apparent-
ly inexperienced in matters of monetary policies.85  
Notwithstanding the splits opening in the party of the Rhenish electors, they must have con-
tinued to offer at least some resistance to the creation of a bimetallic currency. This is the 
most probable reason for why the version of the draft currency bill discussed at the Diet in 
Augsburg omitted the paragraph that concerned the equal value of Rhine gulden and silver 
72-kreuzers piece. The Imperial recess left the question open, too. However, as mentioned 
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above, it asked the Emperor to publish the currency bill immediately after the old and foreign 
money in circulation had been valuated. The delegates of all four Rhenish electors explicitly 
agreed to this.86 Charles V knew that they opposed a bimetallic system,87 but rather than mak-
ing sure that they had finally become resigned to such a currency, he chose to interpret the 
Diet’s request as an invitation to use his own discretion: He followed the vote of the Princes’ 
Council in Speyer. The bill he published in summer 1551 thus established a bimetallic curren-
cy; silver coins from the 72- to the 6-kreuzers piece were to be ‘given and taken by everyone 
in sales, purchases and other transactions as legal tender in place of gold’.88  
The atmosphere at the currency conference in summer 1557 differed from the one at the Diet 
six years before in Augsburg. Not only had the emperor’s pressure on the delegates of the 
Rhenish Electors disappeared, they were also better informed. They left no doubt about reject-
ing bimetallism. However, it soon became evident that the majority of the estates, led by elec-
toral-Brandenburg and Bavaria, wished to retain (or to introduce at long last) the currency 
established by the bill of 1551:89 The vehement complaints stressed by the Saxon envoys in 
no way impeded the talks that were conducted in a mostly sober and matter-of-fact tone. As 
demanded by the recess of the Regensburg diet of 1557, the memoranda of the estates were 
submitted to the next Imperial Diet in order to provide the basis for further discussions. 
At this diet, which took place from 1558-59 (again) in Augsburg, a proposal first advanced by 
the electoral Palatinate turned out to be decisive. At the conference of 1557 the Palatinate’s 
deputies had suggested abolishing the silver 72-kreuzers piece and replacing it with a 60-
kreuzers unit.90 In Augsburg, the idea met with much approval. This was the case because the 
participants believed to have noticed that the 72-kreuzers piece was used to justify price rises; 
a smaller coin as the highest unit of the currency promised to alleviate the problem.91 King 
Ferdinand probably welcomed the proposal because the traditional Austrian currency already 
included a 60-kreuzers piece so that introducing the new Imperial money would not have in-
volved much upheaval.92 However, if the 72-kreuzers piece was dropped, abolishing the fixed 
link between gold and silver seemed obvious.93 This was the decision made at Augsburg in 
1559 and enshrined in the reformed currency bill Ferdinand published in that year. The bill 
sealed the failure of the attempt to establish a bimetallic system at the level of the Empire. 
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However, it allowed Ferdinand to welcome the Rhenish electors into the fold of common 
monetary policies. The desire to achieve this end, rather than the insight that, in the long run, 
relative prices of gold and silver were fluctuating and the attempt to create a stable bimetallic 
currency therefore futile, seems to have triggered the reform.94 After the publication of Ferdi-
nand’s reformed bill, the last party to offer resistance was Saxony that joined the common 
Imperial currency only seven years later. In return, the Imperial Diet admitted the taler as 
legal tender.95  
7. Conclusion 
Before Ferdinand I’s currency bill was published, the question of whether or how the Saxon 
taler might be integrated into the common currency was never on the agenda. Electoral-
Saxony was not represented at the currency conference of autumn 1549. At the conference in 
summer 1557, the Saxon deputies declared their opposition to Charles V’s currency bill of 
1551, but during the talks the taler-question never surfaced. The only one to briefly mention 
the Saxon position was the Pomeranian envoy: He claimed that the complaints of the Saxon 
deputies pertained less to the content of the bill of 1551 than to its inadequate enforcement.96 
Obviously, the participants in the discussions did not consider Saxony and the taler-question 
as crucial. What concerned them was the issue of bimetallism and the resistance of the Rhen-
ish electors.97 
This was the main problem. One core result of the present study is that it was the position of 
the Rhenish electors that made it impossible to effectively implement the currency bill of 
1551, and that this position was a function of their interest in their custom dues. These dues 
were a source of much of their revenues and were defined in terms of gold. As the value of 
gold increased relative to that of silver, the electors opposed a legally determined ratio be-
tween coins made of both metals as much as the obligation to accept silver in custom pay-
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ments according to this ratio. Such a bimetallic system would have allowed merchants to ex-
ploit a further rise in the market value of gold – or a fall in that of silver – to pay their dues in 
silver coins according to their value as defined in the currency bill. The electoral revenues 
would have suffered accordingly. 
If Charles V’s common currency had failed merely because the electors on the Rhine opposed 
it, the hypothesis that the emperor was too weak would sufficiently explain this outcome. 
However, the argument misses the point. After all, Ferdinand I succeeded in generating near 
universal consent for a common currency – and he succeeded at a time when his political po-
sition was far less dominant than that of his brother after the Schmalkaldic war. Despite the 
last estate to adopt the Imperial currency doing so only after Ferdinand’s death, it is evident 
that an emperor able to skilfully balance the interests of the estates had considerable scope to 
shape monetary politics at the level of the Empire. 
This is where Charles V failed. He knew that some of the highest-ranking estates of the em-
pire opposed his plans. At the Diet of 1550-51, Trier and the Palatinate may have been re-
signed to a bimetallic currency, but Mainz and Cologne’ certainly were not. Still, if the em-
peror did not want to directly go against the wishes of the Diet, he had to fulfil the request to 
publish the bill within a reasonably short period of time after the old and foreign money had 
been evaluated. This he could not do without autonomously resolving the issues the Diet had 
left open. Moreover, regardless how he answered the bimetallism question, he was bound to 
antagonise important estates, i.e. either the electors on the Rhine or the Princes’ Council. He 
was in a situation where he could make no right decision. 
Nothing points to the Diet having intentionally created this double bind. Rather, what appears 
to have been crucial was an underlying structural cause: the lack of continuity in the composi-
tion of the delegations that discussed monetary policies at the currency conferences and Impe-
rial Diets. The way the draft of the currency bill was discussed at the Augsburg Diet shows 
this particularly clearly. Apparently, few of the councillors of the Rhenish electors present at 
the diet were aware of what a legally fixed ratio between gold and silver coins implied for the 
electoral revenues. The lack of continuity in the personnel involved in shaping monetary poli-
cies is what seems to have brought about the coordination failure that created the dilemma in 
which Charles V found himself. Ferdinand I did manage to avoid such a situation by being 
willing to compromise and making sure that all relevant estates agreed to his plans. This is 
how successful politics in the Empire worked. 
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